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PRIVATE LAW
the plaintiffs' action was in the nature of an accounting for the
imperfect usufruct which their father had on the stock. The
court held that the usufruct on corporate stock is not an im-
perfect but a perfect usufruct since the usufructuary need not
.sell, alienate, or change the substance of the property in order
'to enjoy it, the usufructuary being entitled to the fruits in the
form of dividends. Accordingly, the court held, the alienation
of the stock in question was in breach of the usufructuary's
fiduciary obligation, and their rights to recover the same could
not prescribe, for under the provisions of article 3510. prescrip-
tion cannot run in favor of the usufructuary as against the
rights of naked owners.82
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Robert A. Pascal*
Article 2408 of the Civil Code is the only Louisiana legisla-
tion on accounting between the separate and common interests
of the spouses on the termination of the community of acquets
and gains and it foresees only one type of case, the increase
in the value of a separate asset of either spouse by their "com-
mon labor, expenses, or industry." Here the "other spouse" is
entitled to receive one-half of the increase in value. Tooley v.
Pennison1 presented the case of one spouse's separate asset,
acquired before marriage on credit, being paid for in part after
marriage with common funds. Clearly there is no question in
,this instance of the augmentation of the value of the asset, but
rather a payment of a separate obligation with common funds,
and thus the court properly decided that the spouse whose sep-
arate obligation had been paid should reimburse the common or
community fund for the amounts so expended.
2
. 32. "As relates to the facts in the present case, were this Court to say that
since the petitioners did not assert their rights to the stocks within ten years
after the termination of the usufruct, their rights have prescribed; we would
actually be saying that there can be acquisitive prescription under a usufruct.
Such a holding would be directly contrary to the clear and express provision
of Civil Code Art. 3510." Id. at 381.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 157 So. 2d 628 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
2. The same decision also declared that land in a separate property state,
bought in the husband's name with common funds, belonged to the husband, but
that the husband must reimburse the common fund. Id. at 630. This questionable
solution is discussed in the Conflict of Laws portion of this Symposium.
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There is, as mentioned above, no specific rule on what is to
be the accounting when separate assets become mingled with
community assets or are used to purchase community assets, but
here again the jurisprudence has considered the community in-
debted to the spouse whose separate asset was utilized or con-
tributed to the extent of its value at the time it was so utilized
or contributed. This was the rule applied in Succession of Hol-
lier,3 a case in which a spouse's separate capital obtained on
dissolution of one partnership was used as capital contributed
to a new partnership under circumstances in which the con-
tribution became a community asset.4
Also of interest in the area of marital regimes was the de-
cision in Tilton v. Tilton," in which a "property settlement"
executed during marriage was declared ratifiable after divorce.
Care must be taken to understand the limits of such a decision.
The "property settlement" executed during marriage purports
to be both a dissolution of the marital property regime and a
partition of assets. As an attempt at a dissolution of the marital
regime such an act can have no effect whatsoever, for such a
regime can be terminated only by a judgment of separation
from bed and board, divorce, or separation of property. 6 Thus
the marital regime cannot be terminated retroactively to the
date of its attempted conventional dissolution by any act of
ratification. On the other hand, there would appear to be no
reason why the partition made in such an act could not be rati-
fied, and, so understood, the Tilton decision seems unobjection-
able.
A decision not on a question of community property, but of
great interest in determining whether an acquisition falls into
the community, is that in Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Lewis. 7
Reduced to its simplest terms, the decision affirms that an
asset contracted for during the existence of the community falls
into the community even if it is actually received after its dis-
solution. The writer considers this solution unimpeachable in
principle for cases in which the prestation of the spouse is made
during the marriage under conditions which would render that
3. 158 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
4. Vining v. Beatty, 161 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) illustrates that
separate assets may lose their character through intermingling with community
assets.
5. 162 So. 2d 733 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
6. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 155, 159, 2329, 2427.
7. 245 La. 499, 159 So. 2d 132 (1964).
[Vol. XXV,
PRIVATE LAW
to be received a community asset if it were to be actually re-
ceived during marriage. The time for delivery or receipt of that
bargained for, in other words, should not itself be relevant if
that given for it is a performance during marriage under condi-
tions which would render the acquisition during marriage a com-
munity asset. The rule could not be applied justly, however, to
an asset received after divorce merely because it was received
pursuant to a contract entered into during marriage; it would
be incorrect, for example, to treat as a community asset the
remuneration received after divorce for services rendered there-
after merely because the services had been rendered pursuant
to a contract entered into during marriage.
8
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
The principle that a third party cannot accept an offer ad-
dressed to another is recognized by the provisions of our Civil
Code.' The Code contains also a number of articles which deal
with error as to the person. In the first case there is an ab-
sence of consent; in the other, consent is given but is based on
error. The latter case arises when one deals with another under
a. mistaken belief in the other's identity or capacity. In Na-
tional Crankshaft Co. v. Natural Gas Industries, Inc.,2 the de-
fendant ordered a crankshaft from one supplier and it was sub-
sequently shipped by another who was a stranger to the trans-
8. Other decisions applying recognized solutions in community property cases
were: Glassell v. Dickerson, 159 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) applying
the rule that the purchase by the wife with separate funds becomes a community
asset, unless she can prove she purchased the item with separate funds with
intent to have it as separate asset; Cormier v. Billeaudeau, 159 So. 2d 780 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1964) affirming that a partition after divorce can be translative
of ownership between parties even for land not specifically described; Harris v.
Harris, 160 So. 2d 359 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) affirming that only net income
from separate assets of husband falls into the community; Vining v. Beatty,
161 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) applying the rule of article 2386 as
amended by Acts 1944, No. 286 that fruits of the separate property of the wife
fall into the community unless she declares in writing that she reserves them for
her separate use and benefit; and Acremont v. Acremont, 162 So. 2d 813 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1964) affirming that after divorce the community is dissolved and
husband and wife become co-owners in indivision.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1798, 1800 (1870).
2. 158 So. 2d 370 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
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